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Abstract
We experimentally study the eﬀects of the split-award tort reform, where the state takes a
share of the plaintiﬀ’s punitive damage award, on litigants’ beliefs and bargaining outcomes.
In addition, we study the formation of litigants’ beliefs in a strategic environment. Our results
provide support for coherence-based reasoning theories: coherence shifts in litigants’ background
beliefs (elicited before a role is assigned and after commitment to a choice at the pretrial bar-
gaining stage) suggest bi-directionality between choices and beliefs. Our findings also suggest
role-specific bias in the updating of plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about firm’s negligence. Finally, our find-
ings indicate that split-awards aﬀect plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about fairness and lower out-of-court
settlement amounts.
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1 Introduction
Punitive damage awards are primarily intended to punish defendants for their egregious
conduct against society and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future
(Sloan, 1993).1 There is a common perception that excessive punitive damage awards2 have
contributed to the escalation of liability insurance premiums and have generated financial
burden on firms.3 This perception has motivated several tort reforms in U.S. states (Sloane,
1993). Some reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive damage awards while others
mandate that a portion of the award be allocated to the plaintiﬀ with the remainder going
to the state. These latter reforms, called “split-awards” have been implemented in Alaska,
California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah.4 In addition, New
Jersey and Texas have contemplated, but not yet adopted, split-award statutes (White,
2002).
Previous work on split-awards (Daughety and Reinganum, 2003; Landeo and Nikitin,
2006; Landeo et al., 2007a) suggests that this tort reform aﬀects litigation outcomes. These
statutes might reduce settlement amounts and increase the likelihood of out-of-court set-
tlement. As a consequence, split-awards might also decrease the firm’s expected litigation
loss.5
Recent findings from social psychology on individual decision-making involving binary
choices based on multiple judgments and beliefs (Simon et al., 2001; Simon et al., 2004b)6
provide evidence on coherence-based reasoning: “[t]hroughout the decision-making process,
1The exact words used to describe the standard of proof for punitive damages vary by jurisdiction (Landeo
et al., 2007b). In this paper, we use “gross negligence” to represent the punitive damage standard.
2Justice O’Connor stated that punitive damage awards had “skyrocketed” more than 30 times in the
previous ten years, with an increase in the highest award from $250,000 to $10,000,000 (Browning-Ferris
Indus, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282, 1989).
3See White (2004).
4Statutes vary with the state: the base for computation of the state’s share can be the gross punitive
award or the award net of attorney’s fees; the state’s share can be 50%, 60% or 75%; the destination of the
state’s funds can be the Treasury, the Department of Human Services or indigent victims funds. For details,
see Dodson (2000), Epstein (1994), Stevens (1994), Sloane (1993).
5Note that under split-awards, the plaintiﬀ’s award at trial is lower (and hence, plaintiﬀs are willing
to accept lower settlement oﬀers), but the defendant’s loss at trial remains the same. The contract zone,
defined as the range of settlement values that make both sides better oﬀ than not settling, is then larger. As
a consequence, the likelihood of out-of-court settlement is higher under this statute. Note also that, given
that out-of-court settlement amounts are lower and the likelihood of out-of-court settlement is higher, the
firms’ expected litigation losses will be lower under split-awards. Finally, note that the firm’s level of care
and filing of lawsuits have been kept constant in this analysis. See Landeo, et al. (2007b) for an extension
of this analysis under endogenous filing and firm’s level of care.
6See also Simon et al., 2004a; Simon, 2004; Holyoak and Simon (1999).
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the mental representation of the considerations undergoes gradual change and ultimately
shifts toward a state of coherence with either one of the decision alternatives [...] As the
hard case morphs into an easy one, the decision follows easily and confidently. The fact that
decisions are ultimately based on skewed models and backed by high levels of confidence
facilitates the making of the decision” (Simon, 2004; pp. 513, 517). Coherence-based rea-
soning theories suggest an alignment between beliefs and choices (even prior to the point of
commitment to a decision),7 and a bi-directional relationship between choices and beliefs.
Given that decision-making involving many choices based on multiple judgments and
beliefs is expected to be more complex than decision-making in binary-choice scenarios, we
might infer that coherence-based reasoning mechanisms will also be present in multiple-
choice environments (i.e., pretrial bargaining environments with a continuum of possible
out-of-court settlement choices). If we apply the findings on coherence-based reasoning to
the study of split-awards, then we might expect that this tort reform will also aﬀect litigants’
beliefs. Note that, under split-awards, lower settlement oﬀers are accepted by the plaintiﬀs
(and oﬀered by the defendants). Given that coherence-based reasoning suggests that choices
and beliefs should be aligned, if coherence shifts are driven by quantitative diﬀerences in out-
of-court settlement choices, then we might expect smaller shifts in litigants’ beliefs under
split-awards. Previous work on split-awards, however, has overlooked the potential indirect
eﬀect of this statute on litigants’ beliefs. Our research attempts to fill this gap.
Our paper experimentally studies the eﬀects of the split-award tort reform on litigants’
beliefs and bargaining outcomes using a complex legal environment, a controlled laboratory
setting, and human subjects paid according to their performance. In addition, we study the
formation of litigants’ beliefs in a strategic environment (i.e., within a pretrial bargaining
game between a plaintiﬀ and a defendant and a continuum of possible out-of-court settlement
choices). To the best of our knowledge, no experimental test has been previously conducted
to assess coherence-based reasoning in strategic settings with multiple choices,8 or to explore
the interaction between public policy and coherence-based reasoning. Given that field data
on pretrial bargaining processes are not available or are incomplete (Daughety, 2000), and
belief formation is virtually impossible to be observed in real-world settings, conducting an
experiment seems to be a valuable alternative.
7Note that, in contrast to the cognitive dissonance view (Festinger, 1957), in which shifts serve only as
post hoc rationalizations for decisions driven by other factors or diﬀerent mechanisms (i.e., attitudes and
preferences change due to post-decision regret), coherence-based reasoning theories suggest that shifts might
occur prior to the commitment to a decision as a means of facilitating complex decision-making processes
(Simon et al., 2001).
8Simon et al. (2004b) assess coherence-based reasoning in individual binary choices using a complex legal
case and internet-based experiments.
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The experiment encompasses a 2 (statute) X 2 (role), between-subject design. The
statutes are split-awards (where the plaintiﬀ receives 25% of the court award) and no split-
awards (where the plaintiﬀ receives 100% of the court award). The roles are plaintiﬀ and
defendant.
We explore the formation of beliefs at a within-statute level (within-subject analysis),
and the eﬀects of split-awards on litigants’ beliefs and bargaining outcomes at a between-
statute level (between-subject analysis). First, at a within-statute level, we elicit subjects’
beliefs and ask subjects to play a pretrial bargaining game. We assess coherence-based
reasoning by analyzing bi-directionality between pretrial bargaining choices and background
beliefs.9 Specifically, we evaluate whether the posterior background beliefs (elicited after a
choice is made) diﬀer from the prior background beliefs (elicited before a role is assigned
and the information about the legal case is provided). We also assess whether these shifts
reflect an alignment between posterior background beliefs and litigants’ choices at the pretrial
bargaining stage. Second, at a between-statute level, we assess whether split-awards aﬀect
litigants’ shifts in background beliefs, the after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence, and the
beliefs about fairness. In addition, we explore whether split-awards aﬀect the likelihood of
out-of-court settlement and the settlement amount (i.e., whether litigants observe a strategic
behavior at the pretrial bargaining stage.)
Our findings are as follows. First, our results provide support for coherence-based-
reasoning theories on the formation of beliefs. Indeed, significant shifts in background beliefs,
aligned to the litigants’ choices at the pretrial bargaining stage, suggest bi-directionality be-
tween choices and background beliefs. Second, our findings suggest that litigants form their
post-role beliefs about firm’s negligence in a role-specific way. Given the alignment of these
beliefs with the not-yet-committed choices at the pretrial bargaining stage, these findings
also provide some evidence on coherence-based reasoning. Third, our results indicate that
split-awards significantly aﬀect plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about fairness. In addition, split-award
statutes significantly lower out-of-court settlement amounts.
Previous literature on split-awards suggests that this tort reform reduces settlement
amounts and the likelihood of trial (see Daughety and Reinganum, 2003; Landeo and Nikitin,
2006; and, Landeo et al., 2007a). We complement this literature by exploring the eﬀects of
split-awards on litigants’ beliefs. A second branch of relevant literature studies coherence-
based reasoning in binary choices at an individual decision-making level (Simon et al., 2004b,
9Background beliefs refer to the subjects’ beliefs about behavior of firms in the marketplace (such as
firms’ concerns about safety, firms’ concerns about service quality), negligence of firms involved in product
liability lawsuits, credibility of witnesses in lawsuit cases, among others. See the appendices for details. The
appendices are available at http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/econweb/landeo/.
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2001; and Holyoak and Simon, 1999). Our analysis extends this work (i) by studying the
formation of beliefs in a strategic setting (i.e., litigants’ decision-making within a pretrial
bargaining game and a continuum of possible out-of-court settlement choices), and (ii) by as-
sessing the interaction between belief formation and tort reform (i.e., by studying the eﬀects
of split-awards on belief formation).
A third branch of related literature focuses on self-serving bias in bargaining settings.
Babcock et al. (1997, 1996, 1995a, 1995b) and Loewenstein et al. (1993) explore the eﬀect
of self-serving bias on pretrial bargaining outcomes. Babcock and Pogarsky (1999) assess
the eﬀects of damage caps on self-serving bias in predicted trial awards, and on settlement
rates.10 Their findings suggest that litigants’ assessment of fairness and their predicted trial
outcomes determine their pretrial bargaining choices (i.e., beliefs influence choices) and that
caps encourage settlement and reduce the magnitude of the self-serving bias. We extend
previous work on self-serving bias (i) by studying the eﬀects of the role assigned at the
bargaining stage on litigants’ beliefs about the defendant’s negligence, (ii) by studying bi-
directionality between choices and background beliefs (i.e., whether choices at the pretrial
bargaining stage aﬀect background beliefs), and (iii) by analyzing the eﬀects of the split-
award tort reform on the formation of litigants’ beliefs about fairness and background beliefs.
Several implications are derived from our study. First, our findings on the eﬀects of split-
awards on plaintiﬀ’s beliefs about fairness suggest that this tort reform might operate as a
debiasing through law mechanism.11 Hence, split-award statutes might enhance eﬃciency on
current bargaining processes. Second, our findings regarding belief formation indicate that
legal processes (such as pretrial bargaining negotiations) might operate as biasing through law
mechanisms. It can be argued that if recurring coherence shifts leave a strong imprint, then,
repeated shifts in background beliefs might operate as a form of learning (Simon, 2004).
Hence, legal processes might distort future choices of individuals. Finally, the evidence
provided by our study about bi-directionality between choices and background beliefs in
strategic settings might motivate theorists to construct dynamic economic models of strategic
interaction under coherence-based reasoning.12
10Self-serving bias is defined here as the litigants’ diﬀerence in predicted trial awards. Hence, a within-
subject analysis of the eﬀects of caps on the formation of litigants’ beliefs is not performed.
11In addition, consistent with Babcock and Pogarsky’s (1999) findings on the eﬀects of caps on self-serving
bias, our results also suggest that split-awards reduce litigants’ self-serving bias in the oﬀers made at the
pretrial bargaining stage (defined as the diﬀerence between the oﬀers made by plaintiﬀs and defendants).
This result provides additional support to the claim that split-award statutes might operate as debiasing
mechanisms. See the seminal paper on debiasing through law by Jolls and Sunstein (2006).
12Another branch on the literature has studied preferences over beliefs. Some economic models have
incorporated preferences over beliefs on single-agent decision games (see Yariv, 2005; and, Bracha, 2004). A
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the qualitative hypothe-
ses. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 examines the results from the
experimental sessions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Qualitative Hypotheses
We use the following concepts in the formulation of hypotheses. First, we define background
beliefs as those beliefs that subjects exhibit about the behavior of firms in the marketplace
(such as beliefs about firms’ concerns about safety, firms’ concerns about service quality),
negligence of firms involved in product liability lawsuits, credibility of witnesses in lawsuit
cases, among others.13 Background beliefs are elicited in two moments: prior background
beliefs are elicited before a role is assigned and before the information about the case is
provided; and, posterior background beliefs are elicited after the pretrial bargaining game
is conducted. A shift in background beliefs is defined as the diﬀerence between posterior
and prior background beliefs (i.e., posterior minus prior beliefs). Second, we define the
plaintiﬀ’s reservation value as the minimum acceptable out-of-court settlement proposal,
and the defendant’s reservation value as the maximum acceptable out-of-court settlement
oﬀer. Third, we define plaintiﬀ’s aspiration as the amount that he would like to receive, and
defendant’s aspiration as the amount she would like to oﬀer.14
The qualitative hypotheses to be tested in our experiment are as follows.
Research on self-serving bias (Babcock et al., 1995a; Babcock et al., 1995b; Babcock
and Loewenstein, 1997) indicates that settlement proposals exhibit role-specific biases (i.e.,
plaintiﬀs’ settlement requests will be higher than defendants’ oﬀers). These biases might
be consistent with motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990, 1987).15 Coherence-based reasoning
theories suggest bi-directionality between background beliefs and the choices made on the
recent paper by Eliaz and Schotter (2006) provides experimental evidence suggesting that individuals derive
an intrinsic benefit from their posterior beliefs.
13These beliefs do not refer to the behavior of any specific firm or any specific person. See the appendices
for details.
14Following Kray et al. (2001), we assess the litigants’ aspirations by analyzing their first out-of-court
settlement proposals.
15As stated by Kunda (1990), “[p]eople rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their
desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given
occasion.” Motivated reasoning can be then understood as people’s propensity to reason (by eﬀectively
attending only to some of the available information) in a way that supports their subjectively favored
propositions. Kunda (1987) suggests that “self-serving biases are best explaining as resulting from cognitive
processes guided by motivation because they do not occur in the absence of motivational pressures” (p. 636).
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basis of those beliefs. Then, the choices at the pretrial bargaining stage might aﬀect the
posterior background beliefs. Specifically, litigants might adjust their background beliefs in
a self-serving manner, i.e., they might increase (decrease) their beliefs about the likelihood
of issues that strengthen (weaken) their case. Hence, we might expect that the litigants’
posterior background beliefs will diﬀer from their prior background beliefs, and that the
shifts in background beliefs will exhibit role-specific patterns. Given that background beliefs
“[are embedded in larger knowledge systems and attitudinal structures” (Simon, et al., 2004;
p. 833), it is expected that those beliefs would be more resistant to change (than the
evaluation of legal evidence, for instance). Hence, shifts might be more likely to occur in
case of background beliefs perceived by the litigant as more relevant to her legal case (i.e.,
issues that might strengthen or weaken the litigant’s case).
Hypothesis 1. Under both split-award institutions, posterior background beliefs will be diﬀer-
ent from prior background beliefs, for plaintiﬀs and defendants. Shifts in background beliefs
will follow a role-specific pattern.
As mentioned before, research on self-serving bias suggests that plaintiﬀs’ settlement
requests will be higher than defendants’ oﬀers. Coherence-based reasoning studies (Simon et
al, 2001) suggest that beliefs are aligned to the not-yet-committed choices made under those
beliefs. Then, although the posterior beliefs about firm’s negligence are elicited before the
litigants commit to their choices at the pretrial bargaining stage, we might expect to observe
higher after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence on subjects who play the role of plaintiﬀ.
Note that, given that both litigants receive the same information about the legal case, this
updating of beliefs will represent a violation of Bayes’ rule.
Hypothesis 2. Under both split-award institutions, the plaintiﬀ’s after-role beliefs about firm’s
negligence will be higher than the defendant’s after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence.
Split-awards reduce the plaintiﬀ’s share of the court award. Then, split-awards might
induce plaintiﬀs to accept lower out-of-court settlement amounts. The strategic defendants,
anticipating the plaintiﬀs’ behavior, will make lower settlement oﬀers. Assuming that co-
herence shifts are driven by quantitative diﬀerences in out-of-court settlement choices, we
might expect smaller shifts in litigants’ background beliefs under split-awards. Otherwise,
we might observe no eﬀect of split-awards on litigants’ beliefs.
Hypothesis 3. If coherence shifts are driven by quantitative diﬀerences in out-of-court set-
tlement choices, then shifts in litigants’ background beliefs under the split-award institution
will be smaller than those shifts under the no split-award institution.
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As mentioned above, split-awards reduce the plaintiﬀ’s share of the court award. Then,
plaintiﬀs will be more willing to accept lower out-of-court settlement proposals, i.e., split-
awards will lower their reservation values. As a consequence, plaintiﬀs will make lower
settlement demands, i.e., split-awards will lower plaintiﬀ’s aspiration. The strategic defen-
dant, anticipating the behavior of the plaintiﬀ, will make lower settlement oﬀers. Hence,
split-awards will decrease defendant’s aspiration. Note, however, that given that the defen-
dant’s expected loss at trial is not aﬀected by split-awards, the defendant’s reservation value
will not be aﬀected by this statute.
Hypothesis 4. Split-awards will decrease plaintiﬀ’s reservation value but they will not af-
fect defendant’s reservation value; and, split-awards will decrease plaintiﬀ’s aspiration and
defendant’s aspiration.
Note first that beliefs about fairness are important components in explaining litigants’
choices at the pretrial bargaining stage (see Babcock and Pogarsky, 1999). Then, by
coherence-based reasoning theories (Simon, 2004; and. Simon et al., 2004a, b), we might
expect that beliefs about fairness and choices at the pretrial bargaining stage should be
aligned. Second, note that split-awards lower plaintiﬀs’ settlement demands and defendants’
settlement oﬀers (see Landeo et al., 2007a.) Given that beliefs and choices made on the
basis of those beliefs should be aligned, we might also expect that split-awards will reduce
the out-of-court settlement amounts considered fair by the litigants.
Hypothesis 5. Split-awards will reduce the out-of-court settlement amounts considered fair by
the litigants.
In addition to explore these hypotheses, our study extends Babcock and Pogarsky’s
(1999) research on self-serving bias and damage caps to the study of the split-award statute.
Our work also extends Landeo et al.’s (2007a) work on split-awards under a free-context
environment to the study of split-awards under a complex legal setting. The expected results
from these extensions are as follows: (i) due to role-specific biases, the plaintiﬀ’s estimated
court award, reservation value, aspiration, and beliefs about fairness will be significantly
higher than the defendant’s estimated values and beliefs; and, (ii) split-awards will decrease
the out-of-court settlement amount, increase the settlement rate, and reduce the defendant’s
expected loss from legal action and the plaintiﬀ’s net compensation.16
16These last results can be explained as follows. Under split-awards, the plaintiﬀ’s award at trial is lower
but the defendant’s loss at trial remains constant. Plaintiﬀs will be then more willing to accept lower
settlement oﬀers. The strategic defendants, anticipating this will make lower settlement oﬀers, which will
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 summarizes the expected results.
3 Experimental Design
In assessing the validity of the qualitative hypotheses, our experimental study analyzes belief
formation and the eﬀects of the split-award institution on litigants’ beliefs and bargaining
outcomes using a 2 (statute) X 2(role), between-subject design. The statutes are split-awards
(where the plaintiﬀ receives 25% of the court award) and no split-awards (where the plaintiﬀ
receives 100% of the court award). The roles are plaintiﬀ and defendant. We use a controlled
laboratory setting, human subjects paid according to their performance, and a full-context
legal environment.
We have specified the experimental setting in such a way that resembles real-life decision
making. Although our experiment cannot predict the eﬀects of the split-award institution in
richer environments, the experiment can provide a reasonable amount of evidence regarding
whether this tort reform in an environment as the one we have structured here will have the
predicted eﬀects.17
Procedural regularity was accomplished by developing a software program that permitted
us to administer the experiment instruments by using networked personal computers.
3.1 The Design
We applied three instruments to perform the within-treatment analysis of belief formation
and bi-directionality between choices and background beliefs.18
Note that Simon et al. (2004b) assess coherence-based reasoning in individual decision-
making with binary choices, using a complex legal case and internet-based experiments. In
be more frequently accepted by plaintiﬀs. Then, the out-of-court settlement amount and likelihood of out-
of-court settlement are higher under split-awards. As a result, plaintiﬀ’s net compensation and defendant’s
expected loss from legal action will be lower under split-awards.
17Note that in real-world settings, litigants’ attorneys also participate in pretrial bargaining processes.
Note also that the participation of attorneys might introduce agency problems and might aﬀect bargaining
outcomes. This paper focuses on the behavior of plaintiﬀs and defendants in pretrial bargaining negotiations.
Hence, the analysis of the behavior of attorneys, the eﬀects of their participation in the bargaining processes,
and the agency problems between attorneys and clients are not considered here. See Babcock and Pogarsky
(1999) and Landeo et al. (2007a) for a similar approach.
18See the appendices for a sample of software screens and written instructions for the plaintiﬀ under the
split-award condition. A complete set of software screens and written instructions is available from the
author upon request.
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their experiments, they analyze coherence shifts in the assessment of legal evidence and
shifts in background beliefs.19 Note that, in contrast to Simon et al.’s (2004b) environment,
our setting involves not only the elicitation of subjects’ beliefs but also the participation of
subjects in a pretrial bargaining game with a continuum of out-of-court settlement choices.
Note also that the assessment of shifts in background beliefs represents a stronger test of
coherence-based reasoning (than the assessment of shifts in the evaluation of legal evidence).
Background beliefs are embedded in larger knowledge and attitudinal structures. Then, it
might be expected that those beliefs would be more resistant to coherence shifts than the
evaluation of legal evidence directly related to the case (Simon et al., 2004b). Finally note
that, in contrast to shifts in the assessment of legal evidence, shifts in background beliefs
might aﬀect future decisions in legal and non-legal settings. Given the complexity of our
experimental environment, we decided to focus on assessing coherence shifts in background
beliefs only.
The three instruments related to the within-subject analysis of belief formation are as
follows.
Elicitation of Prior Background Beliefs
The first instrument was administered before the role was assigned and before the informa-
tion about the legal case was provided. We presented subjects with a group of 13 general
arguments, that we called “social issues,” and requested subjects’ personal opinions about
them. The purpose of this instrument was to elicit the subjects’ prior background beliefs.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 summarizes the thirteen arguments related to the background beliefs. These
arguments referred to the behavior of firms in the marketplace (such as firms’ concerns about
safety, firms’ concerns about service quality), negligence of firms involved in product liability
19In their experimental environment, subjects were asked first to evaluate pieces of evidence (facts) and
background knowledge in isolated vignettes. Second, subjects were presented with information about a
complex legal case, asked to choose a verdict (defendant’s guilt or innocence), and again respond to the
belief and evidence questions in the context of a legal case. For some experiments, the second part of
this benchmark environment was modified to assess the eﬀect of role (assignment to a side) on coherence
shifts. Subjects were assigned to the role of legal interns whose job was to help a judge draft the supporting
arguments for a verdict at which the judge had already arrived. Two roles were included in this setting: the
role of an intern assigned to help write an opinion supporting the defendant’s guilt; and, the role of an intern
assigned to help write an opinion supporting the defendant’s innocence. After learning their roles, subjects
were presented with the information about the case, and asked to give their own verdict, and respond to
belief and fact questions.
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lawsuits,20 credibility of witnesses in lawsuit cases, among others (see Appendices for details.)
Note that these arguments were related to facts included in the legal case that motivated the
next parts of the experiment (some of these arguments favored the defendant’s case and some
others favored the plaintiﬀ’s case).21 However, the arguments were not presented as a part of
a tort case but as separate statements. Subjects were instructed to evaluate each argument
separately, and to choose and type the option (from a five-option scale) that reflected more
closely their personal opinion.22
Elicitation of After-Role Beliefs about Firm’s Negligence, Beliefs about Fair-
ness and Pretrial Bargaining Choices
The second instrument23 was administered after a role was assigned.24 It had the purpose
of eliciting after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence, beliefs about fairness, and assessing
decision making under ambiguity in a strategic pretrial bargaining setting. Subjects were
first randomly assigned the role of plaintiﬀ or defendant, and then provided with material
on a tort case.25 The legal case encompassed the arguments used in the first instrument, but
20Given that we did not require subjects’ previous knowledge of legal terms, we referred to product liability
situations using simple words.
21Only the argument referred to fairness of court decisions in product liability lawsuits was not included
in the legal case information. See Table 2.
22This five-option scale consisted of the following 5 possible percentage values: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and
100%. To help subjects think in terms of percentages, we assigned a label to each choice: none, the minority,
half, the majority, all. For instance, one argument was as follows: “For ... % of companies, the safety of their
product is a priority in their business decisions.”
In previous pilot studies, we used an eleven-option scale and asked subjects to answer the questions by
clicking in the chosen option. We found, however, that the reduction of the possible options from 11 to
5 options and the request to type the chosen option (instead of choosing it by clicking in the option),
i.e., the more active participation of subjects, improved subjects’ understanding of the task and subjects’
concentration. Note that the elicitation of prior beliefs about firms’ negligence also followed this method.
23This instrument follows Babcock and Pogarsky’s (1999) design.
24Between the first instrument and the second instrument (related to the bargaining stage), we apply an
analogy questionnaire as a “distractor task,” to minimize the eﬀects of the previous tasks on the decision
making process of the players at the bargaining stage.
25Given the purpose of this study, we motivated the bargaining stage to the subjects using a rich litigation
context. Research on cognitive psychology indicates that subjects may seem like zero intelligence agents
when they are placed in the unfamiliar and abstract context of an experiment, even if they function quite
adequately in familiar settings. In these cases, subjects will apply their own labels (Loewenstein, 1999). Also
a study conducted by experimental economists (Cooper and Kagel, 2003) reports compelling evidence for
the existence of context eﬀects.
We elicited self-serving biases and coherence-based reasoning by using a detailed legal case. Its facts
involved ambiguity about the degree of gross negligence of the defendant, and hence, complex decision-
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now presented in a more specific form and as components of a tort case. The dispute was
based on the damaged suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ and the possible grossly negligent behavior
of the defendant.26 The plaintiﬀ filed a punitive damages lawsuit for $1, 000, 000 against
the defendant. Subjects were informed that they would have the opportunity to negotiate
an out-of-court settlement agreement and that in case of disagreement, legal costs would be
deducted from both subjects and the court would decide whether to award punitive damages
to the plaintiﬀ. Subjects were also informed that their partners and the court had received
the same information, and that a judge would use these facts to assess the degree of gross
negligence of the defendant in case of trial. Subjects were not informed what the court award
would be.
This second instrument encompassed two parts. The first part consisted of asking subjects
to state their estimated probability about the negligence of the defendant (after-role beliefs
about firm’s negligence),27 their estimate of the award in case of trial, their reservation
values,28 and their beliefs about fairness (i.e., the most fair amount that a plaintiﬀ should
receive as an out-of-court settlement).
The second part of this second instrument consisted of asking subjects to participate
in a pretrial bargaining game. Two players, the defendant and the plaintiﬀ, participated
making processes. The fourteen-page case material included three pages of narrative and eleven pages of
excerpts from the deposition testimony of several witnesses. The legal case used in this study is a modified
version of the case used by Babcock and Pogarsky (1999). We thank Linda Babcock for providing the
material.
26Note that because split awards apply only to punitive damages, the legal case used in this study referred
to a lawsuit seeking punitive damages, where the decision of the court depended only on the assessment of the
defendant’s gross negligence. The concept of gross negligence that the judge would use in court was presented
aloud and explained in detail to the subjects. Note that, we explicitly decided not to define the standard of
proof in terms of a specific level of defendant’s negligence to resemble real-life settings (see Landeo et al.,
2007b, for a discussion of the ambiguity of guidelines for awarding punitive damages in real-world settings;
see also Cooter and Ulen, 2004).
27Note that the use of a 5-option scale (similar to the one used to elicit background beliefs) could increase
the eﬀects of the previous tasks on the decision making process of the players at the bargaining stage. Hence,
we decided to use an open-answer format in this question. Subjects could respond to this question by using
any percentage number between 0 and 100%. We were aware about the shortcoming of this choice: we could
not run statistical tests comparing prior background beliefs about firms’ negligence and after-role beliefs
because prior beliefs should be treated as discrete variables with ordinal information and after-role beliefs
should be treated as continuous variables.
Subjects were also asked to assess the level of confidence on their estimations on the negligence of the
defendant (by choosing a number between 1 and 5).
28In case of plaintiﬀs, the reservation value corresponded to the minimum amount they would accept as
an out of court settlement; and, in case of defendants, the reservation value corresponded to the maximum
amount they would oﬀer as an out of court settlement.
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in a bargaining game. At the beginning of the bargaining stage, every participant in the
experiment was randomly and anonymously paired with another participant. Each player
was equally likely to be paired with any other and the identity of the other person was
never revealed to the players. The bargaining game involved at most 4 five-minute pre-
trial negotiation periods. During each five minute pretrial bargaining period, subjects could
interact with each other. Communication between players was done through a computer
terminal, and therefore, players were completely anonymous to one another.29 Once the
five-minute period was over, subjects were required to submit an oﬀer/demand. If the oﬀer
and demand overlapped (i.e., if the demand from the plaintiﬀ was equal or lower than the
oﬀer from the defendant), subjects settled at the midpoint. Otherwise, they went to the
next bargaining period and $10,000 was charged to both players. If the pair did not reach
agreement after the fourth bargaining period, the court required the defendant to compensate
the plaintiﬀ. Delays in agreement and trial were costly in that they required both plaintiﬀ and
defendant to expend resources. In addition, under the split-award condition, trial implied
that the plaintiﬀ would receive only 25 percent of the award.
Elicitation of Posterior Background Beliefs
The third instrument consisted on presenting subjects with the same arguments used in the
first instrument (identical questions presented in diﬀerent order; see Table 2), and asked
them to perform the same tasks required in the first instrument. This instrument had the
purpose of eliciting subjects’ background beliefs after the pretrial bargaining choices were
made (i.e., posterior background beliefs). Hence, this instrument permitted to assess the
bi-directional relationship between choices at the bargaining stage and background beliefs.30
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in the experiment.
3.2 The Sessions
We ran 7 150-minute sessions of 8 to 18 subjects each (106 subjects in total) at the ex-
perimental laboratory of the University of Alberta School of Business.31 The subject pool
29Subjects used an instant-messenger device (a component of the software designed for this experiment)
to communicate with their partners.
30Note that the first instrument (elicitation of prior background beliefs) and the third instrument (elic-
itation of posterior background beliefs) were separated by 90 minutes approximately (distractor tasks and
tasks related to the second instrument).
31In addition, several pilot sessions were conducted during the first stages of the experimental design.
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was recruited mostly by posting advertisements on public boards and on electronic bulletin
boards. The pool of subjects included graduate and undergraduate students, from a wide
variety of fields of study.
At the beginning of the session, instructions about the software used in the first part
of the experimental session (i.e., related to the first instrument) were presented aloud by
the experimenter to create common knowledge. After the first instrument was administered,
and subjects were informed of their role, written instructions about the bargaining stage and
the legal case material were distributed to the subjects. Then, additional instruction about
the software used in the bargaining stage and the structure of the bargaining stage were
presented aloud. Subjects had 30 minutes to read the case material. To ensure subjects’
understanding of the structure of the bargaining stage, a questionnaire consisting of 11
exercises was administered.32 Finally, subjects started the bargaining stage.33 After this
stage was over, the last instrument was administered.
Subjects were informed about the random process of allocating roles and about the
randomness and anonymity of the process of forming pairs. Information about tasks to
be performed, bargaining stage structure, and payoﬀ computation was common knowledge
among subjects. Subjects were informed only about the game version they were assigned to
play.34 Subjects were also instructed that they would receive their payment in cash at the
end of the experiment.
We used “dollars” as the laboratory currency. Subjects received a flat fee for their par-
ticipation and were paid additional amounts (game payoﬀ) depending on their decision and
those of other subjects. The game payoﬀs, for subjects assigned to the role of plaintiﬀs,
were computed as follows. For a specific session, the subjects with the best performance in
the group of plaintiﬀs received the highest payoﬀ, equal to $35, plus $5 participation fee.
The other subjects, who participated in that session and were assigned the role of plaintiﬀs,
32The experimenter examined the individual answers to each exercise and pointed out the wrong answers.
Time was provided to the subjects to revise the wrong answers. Finally, the experimenter read aloud the
right answers to each exercise, and proceeded to the next stage of the experiment.
33We decided to use a one-shot game because the analysis of how people learn in highly repetitive situa-
tions (learning in games) was not the focus of this study. We were interested in the predictive power of the
theoretical model on the eﬀects of the split-award tort reform in real-world settings, where stationary repli-
cations are almost impossible, and therefore, the type of learning studied in the laboratory under stationary
repetitions is not present (see Camerer (1996) and Loewenstein (1999).
34Given that we needed to explain the payoﬀ structure in detail and aloud and given that the payoﬀ struc-
ture in case of trial was diﬀerent for each condition, we ran only 1 version of the game per session. However,
internal validity was preserved by random assignment of subjects to conditions, and similar populations of
subjects were used in both conditions. Finally, independence of observations was guaranteed by the one-shot
game characteristic of the experiment.
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received a payoﬀ according to their relative performance with respect to the best plaintiﬀ.
Similar procedure was applied to the group of defendants (see Babcock and Pogarsky, 1999,
for a previous application of this method).35 We decided to use this method to avoid in-
troducing noise into the findings due to diﬀerences across subjects in their assessment of an
initial dollar endowment. In addition, we considered that the use of a specific conversion rate
dollars/experimental dollars would reduce the real-life impact of the experimental setting.36
The participation fee was CA $5 and the average game payoﬀ per session was CA$21.37
At the end of each experimental session, subjects received their monetary payoﬀs in cash.
4 Results
The main findings will be presented in a series of results.
Prior and Posterior Background Beliefs
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 reports the within-subject analysis of belief formation, and the between-subject
analysis of the eﬀect of the split-award institution on shifts in background beliefs. Thirteen
arguments on background beliefs were assessed in our study (see Table 2). We report only the
arguments for which prior and posterior background beliefs exhibit significant diﬀerences.
35In Babcock and Pogarsky (1999), The subjects were students enrolled in a negotiations course. Their
game payoﬀs were expressed in terms of grades, and the grades were determined as follows. “[D]efendant
subjects were graded according to how much they obtained relative to other [...] defendants. Lower amounts
meant higher grades” (p. 361). Similar procedure was applied to the plaintiﬀs. Babcock et al. (1995), on
the other hand, determined individual payoﬀs as follows. Before the pretrial negotiation, “[T]he defendant
was given $10 from which to make this payment. Every $10,000 for the case was equivalent to $1 for the
subjects” (p. 1339).
36Note that this method might induce subjects to take variance-increasing actions in order to “get ahead.”
Given the random allocation of subjects to roles and conditions, we might expect, however, that our qual-
itative results will still hold. We were also aware that this method could generate incentives on subjects
to influence other subjects (assigned to the same role) to play similarly. In this way, all players would be
situated at the same level (rank), and hence, all players would get the highest possible payoﬀ. Note, how-
ever, that our one-shot game design precludes the influence that a subject could have on another participant
assigned to the same role through his partners. In a repeated-game, the partners of the subject who wants
to influence the game will later be partners of other subjects assigned to the role of the player who wants to
influence the game.
37The average payoﬀs per session were CA$19 and CA$22, for defendants and plaintiﬀs, respectively.
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A decrease (increase) in the litigant’s reported percentage on an argument that weaken
(strengthen) his case will reflect a coherence shift.
The first three columns refer to the split-award institution, and the next three columns
refer to the no split-award statute. For each split-award institution, the table provides infor-
mation about prior and posterior background beliefs, and the p-values related to comparisons
between prior and posterior beliefs (within-subject analysis). Finally, the last column of the
table reports the p-values related to the comparisons between shifts in background beliefs
(posterior minus prior beliefs) under the split-award institution and shifts under the no split-
award statute (between-subject analysis). Note that, the first three rows present information
on plaintiﬀs, and the last three rows report information on defendants.
In case of plaintiﬀs, the three arguments that exhibited significant diﬀerences between
prior and posterior background beliefs are as follows: negligence of firms involved in product
liability lawsuits,38 religious people’s concerns about safety of others, and unreliability of
witnesses’ testimonies against people they don’t like. The first argument is related to the
plaintiﬀ’s likelihood of succeeding at trial; the second argument is related to the testimony of
the defendant, who claimed that his religious beliefs precluded him to damage others;39 and,
the third argument is related to the testimony of a defendant’s witness, Mr. Densler (a former
colleague of the plaintiﬀ, who did not like him).40 In case of defendants, the three arguments
that exhibited significant diﬀerences between prior and posterior background beliefs are as
follows: inflated lawsuit claims, unreliability of public oﬃcers’ testimonies in favor of people
they like, and unreliability of witnesses’ testimonies against people they don’ like. The first
argument is related to the testimony of a defendant’s witness, Mr. Densler;41 the second
argument is closely related to the testimony of a defendant’s witness, Mr. Olsen (a public
oﬃcer and close friend of the defendant);42 the third argument is common to both plaintiﬀs
38Note that, for the case of defendants, prior and posterior background beliefs about firms’ negligence did
not exhibit significant diﬀerences.
39The defendant stated, “my strong religious beliefs will never allow me to jeopardize the safety of another
human being!”
40Mr. Densler, a defendant’s witness, when questioned by the plaintiﬀ’s attorney stated, “[The plaintiﬀ
and I are not friends] anymore. But [...] I am saying the truth. [The plaintiﬀ] believed that it was okay to
try to milk companies in court.”
41Cyrus Densler, a defendant’s witness stated that the plaintiﬀ said, “God forbid I get injured. But once
I get a lawsuit going, I will inflate my claim.”
42Mr. Olsen, a granting inspector for the Construction Department, when questioned by the plaintiﬀ’s
attorney stated, “Yes, [the defendant and I are closed friends], but [...] my testimony or the results of my
inspections [...] do not have anything to do with that. Public oﬃcers can be trusted even when they act on
matters that concern their close friends.”
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and defendants43
Under both split-award institution, for plaintiﬀs and defendants, we observe coherence
shifts in the litigants’ background beliefs (except for shifts of beliefs regarding the common
argument, in case of defendants). Consistent with Simon et al.’s (2004b), our results suggest
an alignment of litigants’ background beliefs and their choices at the pretrial bargaining stage.
Our findings provide support for Hypothesis 1. These results also suggest that legal processes
(pretrial bargaining negotiations) might operate as biasing through law mechanisms, and
aﬀect future decisions of individuals in legal and non-legal settings.
Note that out of 13 arguments presented to the subjects, only 5 arguments exhibited
significant diﬀerences. We hypothesize that these five arguments were perceived by the
subjects as more closely related to the strengths (or weaknesses) of their cases. Then, these
results might suggest that bi-directionality will be more likely to occur when the background
beliefs are more closely related to the choices, in environments characterized by strategic
decision-making and multiple choices. Our results are also consistent with Simon et al.’s
(2004b) findings on coherence shifts in background beliefs. They found that the changes in
background beliefs were less consistent and weaker than the changes in the evaluation of the
facts. These findings might be explained by the nature of background beliefs. In contrast
to pieces of evidence that are specific to the legal case, background beliefs pertain to larger
knowledge and attitudinal structures. Then, they might be more resistant to change. Hence,
the assessment of shifts in background beliefs represents a stronger test for coherence-based
reasoning.
Result 1: Posterior background beliefs are significantly diﬀerent from prior background beliefs,
for plaintiﬀs and defendants. Shifts in background beliefs exhibit a role-specific pattern.
Finally, note that our results about the eﬀects of the split-award institution on shifts in
background beliefs do not support Hypothesis 3. In fact, across roles, we do not observe a
significant eﬀect of split-awards on shifts in background beliefs. These findings might suggest
that coherence shifts are not driven by quantitative diﬀerences in out-of-court settlement
choices.
After-Role Beliefs about Firm’s Negligence
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
43See the discussion of the third argument for the plaintiﬀs.
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Table 4 reports information regarding the eﬀects of role and split-award institution on
litigants’ after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence. This table includes the information on
prior background beliefs about firms’ negligence (first three columns) to provide a benchmark
for the analysis of role-specific diﬀerences in after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence. Note
that the prior background beliefs about firms’ negligence were elicited before the role was
assigned and the information about the legal case was provided. Hence, these beliefs can
be interpreted as neutral beliefs about firms’ negligence.44 As expected, given the random
assignment of subjects to conditions and roles, prior background beliefs did not depend on
condition or on role, i.e., there was no a significant diﬀerence across roles or conditions.45
The last three columns present information on after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence.
We defined after-role beliefs as those beliefs about the negligence of the defendant reported by
the subjects after the role was assigned and the information about the case was provided (but
before the subjects committed to pretrial bargaining choices.) Under both conditions, our
results indicate that the plaintiﬀ’s after-role belief about firm’s negligence was significantly
higher than the defendant’s after-role belief (p < .01, in both conditions). Note, however,
that only the plaintiﬀs’ shifts in beliefs followed a coherence pattern, i.e., an alignment of
beliefs to the not-yet-committed choices at the pretrial bargaining stage.46 These findings
provide support to Hypothesis 2.47
Note that, despite statistical comparisons between prior background beliefs and after-
role beliefs were not possible, the pattern of defendants’ after-role beliefs did not suggest
coherence shifts.48 These results might be explained as follows. First note that, given that
44The information related to the plaintiﬀ’s prior background beliefs on firms’ negligence included in this
table is also included in Table 3.
45Remember that prior beliefs about firms’ negligence were elicited by providing 5 possible percentage
values to the subjects: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. Note also that a label was assigned to each
value. Then, the prior belief about firms’ negligence is a qualitative variable with ordinal information. The
posterior belief about firm’s negligence, on the other hand, is a continuous variable. That is the reason for
which statistical comparisons between prior background beliefs and after-role beliefs were not performed.
46Although we observed that the after-role beliefs were greater than the prior background beliefs across
roles and conditions, the shift in beliefs for the case of plaintiﬀs was bigger than the shift in beliefs for the
case of defendants. As a consequence, the after-role beliefs for the case of the plaintiﬀs were significantly
higher than those that corresponded to the defendants, under both conditions.
47Because of the diﬀerent way of eliciting prior background beliefs and after-role beliefs, coherence-based
reasoning was not assessed by performing within-role comparisons between prior and posterior beliefs. Note
that the information about prior beliefs confirmed, as expected by the random assignment of roles, that the
two groups of subjects (plaintiﬀs and defendants) were similar. These findings, together with the significantly
higher posterior beliefs of plaintiﬀs, indicate coherence-based reasoning shifts in plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about firm’s
negligence.
48Remember also that, for the case of defendants, prior and posterior background beliefs about firms’
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coherence shifts should respond to the choices at the pretrial bargaining stage, and given
that those choices are aﬀected by the legal environment (standard of proof for granting
a court award) in which decisions are made, then we might expect that the legal envi-
ronment also aﬀects coherence shifts. In our experimental setting, court awards (punitive
damages) were granted only in case of gross-negligence. Note also that, given the definition
of gross-negligence provided to the subjects, it might be inferred that litigants believed that
gross-negligence implied a probability of negligence much higher than 50%. Finally, note
that, given that the prior background beliefs across conditions were lower than 50%, then
defendants might not have the need to shift (reduce) their prior background beliefs’ about
firms negligence to justify low out-of-court settlement oﬀers.49
Given that subjects under both roles received the same information, our results also
indicate the violation of the Bayes’ rule in the updating of beliefs.
Result 2: Under both split-award statutes, plaintiﬀ’s after-role beliefs about the firm’s negli-
gence are significantly higher than defendant’s after-role beliefs.
Our results also suggest that split-awards do not aﬀect litigants’ after-role beliefs about
firm’s negligence. Finally note that, despite the overall ambiguity of the case, we observe
that the subjects displayed high levels of confidence in their after-role assessment of the
negligence of the defendant. In fact, the average level of confidence in their assessments was
4.16 (in a 1-5 scale, 5 representing the highest level of confidence), across roles and conditions
(no significant diﬀerence between roles or conditions).50
Reservation Values and Aspiration
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The first part of Table 5 reports the findings regarding the eﬀects of split-awards and
role on reservation values and aspiration.
The first group of three columns of Table 5 provides information regarding the eﬀects
of split-awards and role on mean reservation values. We defined the defendant’s reservation
negligence did not exhibit significant diﬀerences.
49This argument might also explain the non-significant diﬀerence between defendants’ prior and posterior
background beliefs. We thank a referee for this suggestion.
50These results might suggest coherence-based reasoning in the assessment of the evidence. Simon, et al.
(2004b) state that, “[h]igh levels of confidence are an indicator of [coherence-based-reasoning] because they
are natural consequence of the spreading apart of the subsets of evidence, with the evidence supporting the
[assigned role] dominating the remainder of the evidence” (Simon et al., 2004b, p. 19; comments in brackets).
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value as the maximum amount of money that the defendant would be willing to oﬀer to the
plaintiﬀ as an out-of-court settlement, and the plaintiﬀ’s reservation value as the minimum
amount that the plaintiﬀ would be willing to accept as an out-of-court settlement.51 As
expected, we find that only the plaintiﬀ’s reservation value was influenced by the split award
institution (p = .01, a strongly significant eﬀect).52 This result suggests that the formation
of the plaintiﬀ’s reservation value was strongly influenced by her expected payoﬀ at trial.53
These results support Hypothesis 4.
In addition, under both conditions, the mean reservation value for the defendants repre-
sented no more than 61 percent of the mean value for the plaintiﬀs (significant diﬀerences,
p = .06 and p < .01, for the split-award and no split- award conditions, respectively). These
role-specific reservation values might suggest motivated reasoning.
The second group of three columns of Table 5 reports the eﬀects of split-awards and role
on litigant’s aspiration. Aspiration was defined as the amount defendant (plaintiﬀ) would
like to oﬀer (receive). Following Kray et al. (2001), we used the first oﬀer as the indicator of
litigant’s aspiration.54 Our findings suggest that split-awards significantly reduce plaintiﬀ’s
aspiration.55 These findings provide support to Hypothesis 4 for the case of plaintiﬀs. We
also observe that aspiration is significantly influenced by the role assigned (p < .01, for both
statutes). The eﬀect of role on aspiration might reflect motivated reasoning.
Result 3: Split-awards significantly decrease the plaintiﬀ’s aspiration and reservation value;
split-awards do not aﬀect the defendant’s aspiration or reservation value.
51In order to ensure that the reservation values (and not the aspirations, i.e., amount subjects would like
to receive/oﬀer) will be elicited, we asked subjects to complete the following statements: (i) I would oﬀer to
the plaintiﬀ NO MORE THAN $ ... as an out-of-court settlement, in case of the defendants; and, (ii) I would
accept from the defendant NO LESS THAN $ ... as an out-of-court settlement, in case of the plaintiﬀs.
52Note that only the plaintiﬀ’s expected payoﬀ at trial is aﬀected by the split-award institution.
53If defendants would consider not only their own expected payoﬀs at trial but also their partners’ expected
payoﬀ at trial in the formation of their reservation values, we could observe an eﬀect of split-awards on
defendants’ reservation value. This last eﬀect did not occur in our experiment.
54The diﬀerence between the litigants’ reservation values and first proposals clearly supports the interpre-
tation of first proposals as indicators of aspiration: in case of the defendants, their first oﬀers were lower than
their reservation values (in both conditions); and, in case of the plaintiﬀs, their first demands were greater
than their reservation values. Finally note that, the value of aspiration (first oﬀer) might also reflect strategic
behavior of subjects: first oﬀers might be strategically inflated, in anticipation of further negotiation rounds.
55Our results also indicate that the defendant’s aspiration is lower under split-awards. Given that split
awards aﬀect only the plaintiﬀ’s expected payoﬀ at trial (but not the defendant’s expected loss at trial),
these results might suggest defendants’ strategic behavior. The defendant took into account the reduction
in the plaintiﬀ’s expected loss at trial under split-awards when forming her aspiration. Note, however that
this eﬀect is not statistically significant.
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Result 4: Under both split-award statutes, the plaintiﬀ’s reservation value and aspiration are
significantly greater than the defendant’s values.
Note that, consistent with Babcock and Pogarsky (1999), the plaintiﬀ’s court award
estimate was significantly higher than the defendant’s court award estimate (p < .01, for
both statutes).56 Finally note that, role-specific biases in the proposals made by plaintiﬀs
and defendants during the first three bargaining periods (defined as the diﬀerence between
the plaintiﬀ’s demand and defendant’s oﬀer) were significantly reduced by the split-award
institution (p = .07, p = .01, and p = .05, for the first, second and third bargaining periods,
respectively).57 This last result suggests that the split award statute might operate as a
debiasing through law mechanism.
Beliefs about Fairness
The third group of three columns of Table 5 presents information regarding the eﬀects
of split-awards and role on litigants’ beliefs about fairness. Beliefs about fairness were
defined as the subjects’ estimates of the fair amount of money for the plaintiﬀ to receive
as an out-of-court settlement. The mean plaintiﬀ’s estimate of a fair settlement under
the split-award condition was 34 percent lower than the estimate under the no split-award
condition (p = .01).58 This result provides support to Hypothesis 5, in case of plaintiﬀs.
This eﬀect can be explained as follows. Beliefs about fairness are relevant in determining
pretrial bargaining choices.59 Then, following coherence-based reasoning theories, beliefs
about fairness and pretrial bargaining choices should be aligned. Given that split-awards
56Note also that our findings do not indicate a significant eﬀect of the split-award institution on the court
award estimates. Our experimental design and findings are aligned with the empirical regularities on split-
awards. Given that the award is determined by the jury, and the information about the split-award statute
is supposed to be kept from the jury, the award does not depend on the split-award statute. In order to
reduce unnecessary complexity, in our experiment, the trial award was decided by a judge (instead of a
jury). However, we specified that the judge decision would be based on the same information provided to
the subjects, which did not include information about the existence of two split-award institutions.
57Details of the statistical tests are available upon request. These results are consistent with Babcock and
Pogarsky (1999) findings on the eﬀects of caps on self-serving bias.
58For the case of the defendants, the mean estimate of a fair settlement under the split-award condition
represented 48 percent of the mean estimate under the no split-award condition. However, the eﬀect of
split-awards is not significant.
59We estimated an ordinary least squares regression, with reservation value as the dependent variable, and
after-role beliefs about firm’s negligence and beliefs about fairness as covariates. Consistent with Babcock
and Pogarsky (1999), we found that, across subjects and conditions, the beliefs about fairness significantly
explain the litigants’ reservation values (variable statistically significant, p = .01, for plaintiﬀs and defendants
across conditions). Regression estimation is available upon request.
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significantly reduced the plaintiﬀs’ out-of-court settlement proposals (see Result 7), we might
also expect that these statutes will reduce the amount considered by the plaintiﬀ as a fair
out-of-court settlement outcome. These results provide additional support to the claim that
split-award statutes might operate as debiasing through law mechanisms.
Result 5: Split-awards significantly reduce the plaintiﬀ’s amount considered a fair out-of-
court settlement outcome.
Our findings also suggest that the beliefs about fairness are aﬀected by the role assigned,
under both conditions.60 In fact, the plaintiﬀs’ estimates were more than 150 percent higher
than the defendants estimates (p < .01, under both split-award conditions).61
Result 6: Under both split-award statutes, the plaintiﬀ’s amount considered a fair out-of-
court settlement outcome is significantly higher than the defendant’s amount.
Bargaining Outcomes
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Table 6 reports the eﬀects of split-awards on bargaining outcomes. Our findings are
consistent with Landeo et al. (2007a). As expected, the mean out-of-court settlement under
the split-award condition was lower than the mean out-of-court settlement under the no split-
award condition (a significant diﬀerence, p < .01). This result might suggest that plaintiﬀs
and defendants formulated their out-of-court settlement proposals by considering the lower
expected award at trial under the split award condition. Hence, subjects exhibited strategic
behavior. We also analyzed the defendant’s total litigation loss, defined as the accepted
proposal that is transferred from the defendant to the plaintiﬀ (in case of an out-of-court
settlement), or as the deduction from the defendant’s payoﬀ imposed by the court plus the
defendant’s litigation costs (in case of trial). Our findings suggest a positive and significant
eﬀect of the split-award in reducing the defendant’s total litigation loss (p = .02). This eﬀect
can be explained by the higher probability of out-of-court settlement and the lower mean
out-of-court settlement amounts under the split-award institution. Our findings regarding
the plaintiﬀ’s net compensation (net of litigation cost) suggest that split-awards reduced
60Konow (2005) studies the eﬀects of information and stakes on fairness bias and dispersion. His analysis
suggests that, although information is often used in a self-serving way, increased information can, under
certain conditions, contribute to fairness claims becoming less biased and less dispersed.
61Note that, across conditions and subjects, the values of the estimates of a fair out-of-court settlement
outcome were located between the reported reservation values and the first proposals (aspirations).
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significantly the plaintiﬀ’s net compensation (p < .01). This result is related to the lower
mean out-of-court transfers, and the lower plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ at trial under the split-award
institution.
Result 7: Split-awards significantly decrease the out-of-court settlement amount, the plain-
tiﬀ’s net compensation, and the defendant’s litigation loss.
5 Conclusions
Our paper experimentally studies the eﬀects of the split-award tort reform on litigants’
beliefs and bargaining outcomes. In addition, we study the formation of litigants’ beliefs
in a strategic environment (i.e., within a pretrial bargaining game between a plaintiﬀ and
a defendant and a continuum of possible out-of-court settlement choices). This study re-
ports several interesting results. First, our findings on belief formation suggest the presence
of coherence-based reasoning. We observe coherence shifts in litigants’ background beliefs
toward supporting their choices at the pretrial bargaining stage, i.e., a bi-directional relation-
ship between choices and background beliefs. Second, we find that role-specific bias operates
in the updating of plaintiﬀs’ after-role beliefs about the defendant’s negligence prior to the
commitment to a choice at the pretrial bargaining stage. This finding provides additional
support to coherence-based reasoning theories. It also indicates a violation of Bayes’ rule.
Third, role-specific shifts in the plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about fairness are observed. Fourth, our
findings provide evidence on the eﬀects of split-awards on plaintiﬀs’ beliefs and bargaining
outcomes. We observe that the split-award institution aﬀects plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about fairness.
We also find that out-of-court settlement amounts are significantly lower when bargaining is
performed under the split-award statute.
This study shares a weakness in terms of external validity that is common to all laboratory
experimental research. Although our experiment cannot predict the eﬀects of the split-award
institution and role on settlement in richer environments, this experiment provides evidence
regarding whether the addition of the split-award institution into the bargaining process we
have structured here will have the predicted eﬀects.
Our findings regarding the eﬀects of split-awards on plaintiﬀs’ beliefs about fairness
suggest that this tort reform might operate as a debiasing through law mechanism. Hence,
split-awards might contribute to improve eﬃciency in current decision-making processes. The
observed reduction in biases on litigants’ oﬀers at the pretrial bargaining stage under split-
awards provides additional support to this claim. Our results regarding the coherence shifts
in litigants’ background beliefs suggest that legal processes (pretrial bargaining negotiations)
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might operate as a biasing through law mechanisms. It can be argued that if recurring
coherence shifts leave a strong imprint, then, repeated shifts in beliefs might operate as a
form of learning (Simon, 2004). Hence, participation in legal processes might distort future
choices of individuals in legal and non-legal settings. Policy-makers should be aware of the
potential positive eﬀect of the split-award tort reform, and more generally, consider the
unintended negative consequences of legal processes.
It might be interesting to experimentally assess the factors that aﬀect the level of en-
durance of the coherence shifts in beliefs in strategic settings.62 These, and other extensions,
may be fruitful topics for future research.
62Simon et al. (2008) reports some findings on the duration of coherence shifts regarding job choices,
conducted at an individual decision-making level. His experimental evidence suggests that coherence shifts
can be transitory. However, he states that “a limitation of [these] studies is that [they] did not test decisions
that involve material stakes for the participants” (p. 12; emphasis added). Note also that these environments
did not involve strategic settings.
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Table 1: Qualitative Hypotheses and Extensions to Previous Studies
QUALITATIVE HYPOTHESES
Coherence-Based-Reasoning
(Posteriors - Priors)
1) Plaintiﬀ’s Background Beliefs > 0
that Strengthen the Plaintiﬀ’s Case
2) Defendant’s Background Beliefs > 0
that Strengthen the Defendant’s Case
Role of Plaintiﬀ
(Self-Serving-Bias)
After-Role Belief about Firm’s Negligence +
Split-Award Institution
1) Plaintiﬀ’s Belief about a Fair Settlement -
2) Defendant’s Belief about a Fair Settlement -
3) Plaintiﬀ’s Reservation Value -
4) Defendant’s Reservation Value no eﬀect
5) Plaintiﬀ’s Aspiration -
6) Defendant’s Aspiration -
7) Plaintiﬀ’s Shifts in Posterior Background Beliefs -
that Strengthen the Plaintiﬀ’s Case
8) Defendant’s Shifts in Posterior Background Beliefs -
that Strengthen the Defendant’s Case
EXTENSIONS TO PREVIOUS STUDIES
Role of Plaintiﬀ
(Self-Serving Bias)
1) Estimated Court Award +
2) Belief about a Fair Settlement +
Split-Award Institution
1) Settlement Amount -
2) Settlement Rate +
3) Defendant’s Total Losses -
4) Plaintiﬀ’s Net Compensation -
Note: The belief about a fair settlement corresponds to the litigant’s belief about the fair amount
for an out-of-court settlement; positive and negative eﬀects are represented by the + and − signs,
respectively.
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Table 2: Summary of Questions about Background Beliefs
Position Strengthened
if Value Increase
(Q1/QC) Firms’ Concerns About Safety D
(Q2/QH) Unreliability of Defendants’ (People) Testimonies P
(Q3/QF) Ambiguity of the Legal Case Exploited by Defendants (Firms) P
(Q4/QM) Religious People’s Concerns about Safety of Others D
(Q5/QJ) Firms’ Good Quality of Service D
(Q6/QL) Negligence of Firms Involved in Product Liability Lawsuits P
(Q7/QA) Consultants’ Good Quality of Service D
(Q8/QD) Unreliability of Defendants’ (Business Owners) Testimonies P
(Q9/QB) Companies Exploited in Court by Plaintiﬀs (People) D
(Q10/QI) Unreliability of Public Oﬃcers’ Testimonies in Favor of People They Like P
(Q11/QG) Fairness on Court Decisions in Product Liability Cases N
(Q12/QK) Unreliability of Witnesses’ Testimonies Against People They Don’t Like P
(Q13/QE) Inflated Lawsuit Claims D
Note: Qi/Qj indicate the labels used for the questions regarding prior and posterior background
beliefs, respectively (both questions are identical, but the order and labels used are diﬀerent); P ,
D, and N stand for Plaintiﬀ, Defendant, and Neutral, respectively. See Appendices for detail
about the questions.
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Table 3: Mean Prior and Posterior Background Beliefs
Split-Award No Split-Award p-value(a)
Prior Posterior p-value Prior Posterior p-value
Plaintiﬀ
Negligence of Firms .44 .54 .03 .45 .50 .29 .58
Involved in Product (.05) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Liability Lawsuits [n = 24] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 29]
Religious People’s .60 .47 .01 .51 .41 .02 .56
Concerns about (.04) (.04) (.05) (.05)
Safety of Others [n = 24] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 29]
Unreliability of Witnesses’ .35 .40 .33 .36 .46 .01 .38
Testimonies Against People (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
They Don’t Like [n = 24] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 29]
Defendant
Inflated Lawsuit Claims .58 .69 .09 .55 .67 .03 .74
(.05) (.04) (.05) (.04)
[n = 24] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 29]
Unreliability of Public .54 .41 .02 .47 .44 .45 .23
Oﬃcers’ Testimonies in (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Favor of People They Like [n = 24] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 29]
Unreliability of Witnesses’ .36 .38 .37 .36 .41 .07 .70
Testimonies Against People (.05) (.03) (.04) (.04)
They Don’t Like [n = 24] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 29]
Note: (a) last column refers to the eﬀect of the split-award institution on shifts in background
beliefs (posterior minus prior background beliefs), p-values correspond to the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic test; standard errors are in parentheses; sample sizes are in
brackets; p-values for the third and sixth columns correspond to the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs
Signed-Ranks statistic test.
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Table 4: Mean Prior Background Beliefs and After-Role Beliefs about Firm’s Negligence
Prior Background Beliefs After-Role Beliefs
Split-Award No Split-Award p-value Split-Award No Split-Award p-vlaue
Plaintiﬀ .44 .45 .83 .81 .82 .81
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.03)
[n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 24] [n = 29]
Defendant .45 .47 .84 .48 .55 .36
(.05) (.04) (.07) (.05)
[n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 24] [n = 29]
p .87 .84 .00 .00
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; sample sizes are in brackets; p-values correspond to the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic test.
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Table 5: Mean Reservation Value, Aspiration, and Fair Settlement Belief
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Reservation Value Aspiration Fair Settlement Belief
Split No Split p Split No Split p Split No Split p
Plaintiﬀ 328 497 .01 490 713 .01 402 605 .01
(52) (45) (60) (39) (55) (53)
[n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 24] [n = 29]
Defendant 199 278 .45 87 151 .19 109 227 .13
(34) (44) (14) (29) (18) (42)
[n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 24] [n = 29] [n = 24] [n = 29]
p-value .06 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; sample sizes are in brackets; p-value corresponds to the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic test.
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Table 6: Bargaining Outcomes
Split-Award No Split-Award p-value
Mean Settlement Amount 209,930.6 442,352.8 .00
(pairs that settled out-of-court) (32,440.31) (30,172.21)
Settlement Rate .75 .59 .21
Mean Plaintiﬀ’s Net Compensation 178,830.5 464,334.1 .00
(25,893.17) (33,019.96)
Mean Defendant’s Total Loss 361,812.5 518,816.9 .01
(61,093.97) (34,421.14)
Number of Pairs that Settled Out-of-Court 18 17
Total Number of pairs 24 29
Note: Amounts are expressed in dollar terms; standard errors are in parentheses; p-values
correspond to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic test.
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FIGURE 1
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE EXPERIMENT
Elicitation of Prior Background Beliefs
Assignment of Roles and Provision of Case Information
Elicitation of After-Role Beliefs about Firm’s Negligence,
Beliefs about Fairness, Award Estimate, Reservation Value, and Aspiration
P ’s Demand 1 ≤ D’s Oﬀer 1
Settlement
Elicitation of Posterior Background Beliefs
Bargaining Period 1
P ’s Demand 1 > D’s Oﬀer 1 C1 = $10, 000
Bargaining Period 2
P ’s Demand 2 ≤ D’s Oﬀer 2
Settlement
Elicitation of Posterior Background BeliefsP ’s Demand 2 > D’s Oﬀer 2 C2 = $10, 000
Bargaining Period 3
P ’s Demand 3 ≤ D’s Oﬀer 3
Settlement
Elicitation of Posterior Background BeliefsP ’s Demand 3 > D’s Oﬀer 3 C3 = $10, 000
Bargaining Period 4
P ’s Demand 4 ≤ D’s Oﬀer 4
Settlement
Elicitation of Posterior Background BeliefsP ’s Demand 4 > D’s Oﬀer 4 C4 = $10, 000
Court’s Decision
Elicitation of Posterior Background Beliefs
Note: Ci = cost of disagreement in period i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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